Introduction
Although in the United Kingdom public service broadcasting (PSB) -led by the BBC, a non-commercial entity -has traditionally been seen as the bedrock of the television industry, the United Kingdom is home to a significant private or commercially owned television sector too. The first commercial "ITV" broadcasting licences were awarded in the 1950s and since then the television industry has gone through successive phases of expansion that have multiplied the number of channels and programme-makers.
Development of the private television industry in the United Kingdom has been strongly shaped and influenced by the manner in which it has been regulated. In common with other countries in Western Europe, state authorities in the United Kingdom have played a major role in determining levels of competition and market access and in determining the service specifications and requirements imposed on commercial broadcasters. But the concerns which shaped the development of the private television industry in the United Kingdom have been subject to competing cross-currents and have shifted over the years. An initial focus on "quality" gave way to emerging concerns about competition and commercial efficiency. A desire to sustain and to promote high levels of competition, diversity and plurality has been a recurrent theme. But, as is argued below, achieving a suitable balance between ensuring diversity and promoting economic growth has proven a somewhat problematic challenge for regulators.
The development of the commercial broadcasting sector through the establishment of ITV was initially predicated on promoting regional diversity. Yet, as is discussed below, this aim eventually became overshadowed by a wish to facilitate greater industry efficiency and competitiveness through consolidation. Likewise, the introduction of privately run or independent production firms in principle was intended to promote diversity within the
The commercial television broadcasting industry
In common with many other European countries, the development of broadcasting on a commercial basis in the United Kingdom was preceded by a lengthy period of monopoly for the state broadcaster. At the inception of broadcasting, a major impediment for aspiring market entrants (first in the radio industry and then later in television) was the absence of any obvious means of identifying listeners and charging them directly for broadcast services. In the United Kingdom, the response to this market failure was to establish a form of publicly funded broadcasting. The BBC was given a monopoly to broadcast back in the 1920s, and the decision was taken to fund broadcasting through a compulsory tax, or licence fee, charged to all owners of broadcast-receiving equipment. The possibility of commercial funding through advertising was considered but rejected partly on account of doubts about the commercial viability of this approach but also because of concerns in relation to the perceived power and influence of broadcasting which, as far as UK policymakers were concerned, militated in favour of close regulation and control rather than a free-market approach (Curran and Seaton, 2003; Negrine, 1999) .
However, the setting up of a new "independent television" or ITV channel in the mid-1950s to compete with the BBC shifted the situation from monopoly to duopoly. ITV was the first commercial broadcasting network in Europe and the new channel was supported by revenues from the sale of advertising. It was (and still is) organised as a "network" of 14 regional services covering different segments of the United Kingdom. The ITV network shares programmes through a system where each of the licensees contributes a payment into a collective budget for the ITV schedule of programmes and, in return, receives the right to broadcast that schedule (interspersed with some dedicated local output) in their own region. Each licensee makes money by selling advertising slots in and around transmissions of the MAC/PTWE Page-72 9781137017543_07_cha06
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72 European and National Experiences ITV network schedule in their own regions. Payments into the collective programme budget vary according to the respective revenue shares of participants in the network. So, ITV's arrangements for sharing costs generally involve some cross-subsidisation of smaller regional licensees by larger ones, albeit that precise terms for sharing costs have at times been controversial and required regulatory oversight. More generally, each participantwhether large or small -benefits from being able to transmit a much more expensive schedule of programmes than it could afford if it were trying to operate independently. Part of the intention behind setting ITV up as a network of regional franchises was to support the development of local sectors of production in different parts of the United Kingdom. This aim met with success in areas such as Manchester where the Granada studios are based and in Leeds where Yorkshire Television Studios is located since both Granada and Yorkshire Television were historically major contributors of programming to the ITV collective network. Aside from developing production across the regions, another factor favouring the federal structure was the notion that local viewers would benefit from being served by regional companies who understood the particular needs of their own local audiences.
Although ITV was set up as a shareholder-owned advertiser-supported commercial channel, its licensees are obliged to comply with a range of "public service" style requirements in relation to the quality of its programmes and the need for inclusion of specifically regional and local elements of content. The aim was to stimulate competition for the BBC based primarily on the strength and quality of programme services on offer. As the sole supplier of commercial television airtime until the 1980s, ITV was a highly profitable business. Thus, conditions in the industry favoured the so-called golden era of television with plentiful investment in, for example, high-quality television drama that was popular with UK audiences (Lacey, 2006) . But however contented the public may have been, change was on its way.
In the 1990s, a distinct shift occurred in UK government policy away from the traditional PSB regulatory model and in favour of interventions that encouraged a more market-driven broadcasting industry (Negrine, 1999) . This development reflected not only a change in political ideology following the ascent to power of the Thatcher-led government in the United Kingdom but also a general recognition of the transformative impact that new satellite and cable delivery technologies had in store for national broadcasting systems. UK policymakers were strongly aware of the competitive threat posed by emerging transfrontier satellite broadcasters in Europe and were keen to re-organise the domestic commercial television industry in ways that might be conducive to success in the new multichannel era.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act was a major turning point in UK policy but the inspiration for this piece of legislation was the Peacock Report (1986), MAC/PTWE Page-73 9781137017543_07_cha06
Gillian Doyle 73 a seminal analysis of the economics of the UK television industry, which had concluded that there was simply not enough competition in the sector. Although Peacock endorsed the principle of PSB, he was adamant that this should not be at the expense of all other priorities, especially efficiency. Television had been protected from the disciplines of a free-market and, as a result, had become complacent and wasteful -especially ITV. So, to induce greater efficiency and make ITV more commercial, the 1990 Act introduced a "lighter touch" regulator; an extra commercial channel -Channel 5 -was introduced; commercial broadcasters were required to bid in an auction situation for renewal of their licenses (instead of getting them for free based on promises of quality); and a compulsory access quota for independent producers was imposed on ITV and also on the BBC. A further Broadcasting Act in 1996 carried on in a similar vein offering more de-regulatory concessions for terrestrial broadcasters particularly in the area of ownership and cross-media ownership. The general effect of changes introduced in 1990 and 1996 was to open up the television industry to competition and to make ITV much more costconscious than before. This paved the way for consolidation of ownership at ITV. The first wave of ITV takeovers started almost before the ink had time to dry on the 1996 Broadcasting Act. By 1999, a succession of corporate manoeuvres had resulted in three major ITV players -Carlton, Granada and United News & Media -plus, in Scotland, Scottish Media Group (SMG). Only Ulster TV and Border -two of the smallest companies in the ITV network were overlooked in the consolidation process. A further round of takeovers and mergers involving Carlton, Granada and United News & Media resulted in the formation of ITV plc in 2004, a single dominant player controlling the majority of the regional ITV licences.
The eagerness of the ITV companies to engage in consolidation of ownership was not surprising. Earlier empirical research focused on these firms has confirmed that the larger players in the network are generally more profitable than smaller ones and the reasons for this were summarised by STV's chief executive as follows (cited in Doyle, 2002: 49) :
[In ITV] There are zero marginal costs with everything except networked programmes . . . There is no reason why, say, Granada's regional output or other costs should be any more expensive than STV's. They have exactly the same fixed costs . . . But Granada gets twice as much advertising revenue as STV.
Expansion through acquisition of additional regional ITV licences was an attractive strategy because, for those television broadcasters who operate more than one service economies of scope as well as scale coexist and the more homogeneity possible between both services, the greater the economies of scope. For example, to whatever extent the owner of two MAC/PTWE Page-74 9781137017543_07_cha06
74 European and National Experiences regional ITV licences, or two local cable licences, is able to share the same programming, or common elements within programming, a cost advantage can be achieved. As broadcasters expand the number of services within their control, other cost-efficiencies can be achieved through combining backoffice activities such as finance, administration and airtime sales (ibid.: 51). On a positive note, the consolidation of ITV has created some economic savings and benefits through, for example, more cost-effective delivery of a network's programme service by one rather than several regional owners. However, as far as wider welfare is concerned, a key test is what impact consolidation of ownership has on the total value these services give to their audiences. To favour the public interest, consolidation of broadcasting ownership must be achieved without any reduction in the aggregate listener or viewer welfare. Whether that is the case or not is questionable. Critics have pointed out that consolidation within ITV has resulted not in any improvement in the quality of services but rather, in ITV licensees "trying to cut back their regional and local news coverage" (House of Lords Select Committee, 2008: 61), a development that cannot be said to have advanced the general interests of UK television audiences.
The independent production sector
The development of the United Kingdom's commercial production sector over the last 30 years also reflects competing cross-currents in policy approach between, on the one hand, a desire to promote greater diversity and, on the other, a concern to foster the financial strength of the sector.
Although private television broadcasting had been established in the United Kingdom in 1955, programme-making did not come into existence as a separate stand-alone commercial business activity until many years later. Until the early 1980s, television companies in the United Kingdom -the so-called cosy duopoly of vertically integrated broadcasters comprising the BBC and ITV -generally regarded programme-making as a "cost of sale" associated with broadcasting and virtually all programmes were made in-house by production divisions. This situation was mirrored across Europe where monolithic state broadcasting institutions with their strong traditions of PSB tended to regard content production as an activity integral to broadcasting rather than recognising it as a function that could be carried out separately.
However, the desirability of fostering an economically robust production sector was recognised by UK policymakers (Annan, 1977; Freedman, 2001) . The notion that British audiences too would benefit from greater diversity within the television industry was reflected in a series of policy initiatives from the early 1980s onwards designed to foster the development of an independent production sector. A second advertising-funded (but, unlike ITV, publicly owned) channel -Channel Four -was set up in 1982 as a "publisher-broadcaster," that is with no in-house production capacity of its MAC/PTWE Page-75 9781137017543_07_cha06
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Gillian Doyle 75 own. This was an important first step in creating demand for externally made programmes and therefore promoting the development of a television production sector that was separate and "independent" from the broadcasting sector. Nonetheless, one of the main findings of the Peacock Report (1986) published just a few years after Channel Four had commenced operations was that the vertical structure of the UK television industry still did not allow enough scope for independent producers to compete and participate in programme supply. Peacock's view was that this ought to change. The Report recommended that a compulsory minimum quota be imposed on broadcasters for a proportion of their programming output to be sourced from producers who were "independent," that is not owned or controlled by a television broadcaster (ibid.). The hope was to boost competition within programme production and force UK broadcasters to become more cost-efficient by restructuring their operations so as to disaggregate programme-making from broadcasting.
The 25% compulsory access quota was implemented soon after and, alongside the development of Channel Four, this helped re-distribute demand for television programmes in favour of emergent "indies" and it spawned the development of a production sector that comprised around 800 small-and medium-sized enterprises by the mid-1990s. This served to at least partially curb the dominance of programme-making activities by broadcasters and to widen diversity within programme content (Preston, 2002) . However, although a handful of independent producers generated impressive financial returns (Colwell and Price, 2005) , the majority struggled in terms of business development.
Programme supply is a market place in which the number of sellers (i.e. producers) far outstrips the number of buyers. A problem for the sector was and to some extent still remains that because so many small rival production companies are available to make programmes, individual firms (unless they have already managed to establish reputations as "important" suppliers) tend to lack bargaining power in their negotiations with broadcasters (Doyle and Paterson, 2008) .
By the turn of the twenty-first century, it became increasingly clear that compulsory access quotas alone were not enough to ensure that independent programme-makers could compete effectively with and counter the long-standing strength of the broadcasting industry (ITC, 2002) . On account of their weak bargaining position, UK television content producers were left with little or no ownership of secondary rights. This contrasted with the situation in the United States where, thanks to historically much fuller participation in both the risks and rewards of programme-making, many successful production companies have built up significant financial resources and developed a strong market presence both domestically and internationally. Because UK producers lacked ownership and control over rights, MAC/PTWE Page-76 9781137017543_07_cha06
76 European and National Experiences they had little economic incentive to build up and exploit their programme brands, for example, by developing formats suitable for digital media. The UK government sought to tackle this situation by improving transparency and fairness in deals struck between broadcasters and independent producers (Ofcom, 2006) . The 2003 Communications Act introduced a requirement for Ofcom to monitor and oversee Codes of Practice governing transactions between broadcasters and independent producers. Broadcasters are now required to offer deals to independent producers where primary transmission rights may be unbundled and priced separately from the additional or secondary rights.
Better deals for indies and more opportunity to participate in the rewards that hit television products generate appear to have improved the overall profitability of the independent sector. According to a study commissioned by PACT, the trade association for producers, to consider the impact of improved terms of trade on the health of UK independent producers:
Since 2004, the UK independent production sector has grown into a £2bn industry, with a strong international presence and a wide portfolio of market leading programme IP, either in finished UK programming, overseas productions or international formats. The basis of this growth remains inextricably linked to the UK terms of trade, which provides producers with clarity and opportunity in developing new ideas in the UK which can then be exported to international markets.
(Oliver and Ohlbaum/Pact, 2011a: 10)
The introduction of improved terms of trade has also fed into a further phase of restructuring within the UK independent production sector with the emergence of a number of larger-sized and successful "super indies" (Dignam, 2007) . Among the cluster of larger-sized production companies that have emerged such as IMG, Endemol and All3Media, a more "riskpositive" and entrepreneurial culture is evident with "business models geared to production for the world market and to the maximisation of the global value of . . . rights" (Colwell and Price, 2005: 6) . This helped to pave the way for an improved commercial performance on the part of the independent production sector. Recent survey data confirms that consolidation, cost-cutting and higher income from international exploitation of rights enabled the independent production sector -and especially the larger-sized players within the sector -to achieve much higher level of revenues and of profitability in 2010 than in 2004 (Oliver and Ohlbaum/PACT, 2011b). To keen advocates of competition, it may of course seem paradoxical that the "let a thousand flowers bloom" philosophy which had underpinned the setting up of Channel Four eventually gave way to a realisation that excessive fragmentation in the television production sector might be counterproductive, at least from the point of view of business development MAC/PTWE Page-77 9781137017543_07_cha06
Gillian Doyle 77 (Doyle and Paterson, 2008) . Hence the emphasis of UK state intervention, through oversight of improved terms of trade, has shifted towards indirect support for a further re-structuring involving consolidation of ownership and the emergence of a small number of powerful and robust independent production firms truly capable of countering the strength of vertically integrated broadcasters.
A "Berlusconi moment"
When it first began to leak into the public domain via the financial press in Spring 2010 that News Corporation, the largest newspaper owner in the United Kingdom, was planning to acquire the remaining 61% it did not already own of BSkyB -the United Kingdom's dominant satellite television operator -some commentators described this as "a Berlusconi moment" (Sabbagh, 2010) . It was recognised that this was a moment at which one proprietor might be able to establish a position of unparalleled and irreversible dominance in the media. Why did News Corporation want to take over BSkyB? At a time of declining revenues for its print media operations, such a deal would extend News Corporation's exposure to growth opportunities in pay-television markets. Despite the strategic and commercial logic of a takeover from the company's point of view, the proposed bid was regarded by many as potentially damaging to the public interest (Fenton, 2011a: 4) . Alarm bells rang because, in addition to BSkyB's dominance in the UK pay-television market, the company is the main provider of news to commercial radio stations right across the United Kingdom and also News Corporation owns press titles that at that time collectively accounted for a share of the UK national newspaper market of some 37% (ibid.).
Once News Corporation made known its intention to make a full takeover of BSkyB, UK Minister of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Dr Vince Cable duly stepped in and asked the communications regulator Ofcom to investigate whether or not the deal was likely to act against the public interest, taking into account the need for plurality of voices in the media. The European Commission also immediately set about investigating the competition effects of the deal and in December 2010 concluded that it was unlikely to significantly impede competition in Europe but at the same time the Commission highlighted that responsibility for investigating legitimate concerns about the effects of the acquisition on plurality rested with the UK regulator, Ofcom. The analysis, which Ofcom (2010) carried out in response was very interesting, not least in relation to the question of how digital technology is affecting diversity and pluralism within news provision (Figure 6 .1).
It is sometimes argued that the arrival of the Internet has had such a transformative impact on media provision that restraints over ownership Certainly, it is true that growth of online media delivery has contributed in many ways to a widening of diversity and choice within news provision, for example with the rise of citizen journalism. But Ofcom's research revealed that, despite growth of the Internet, most adults in the United Kingdom still, to a surprising extent, derive their news and views from traditional media platforms, especially television (Ofcom, 2010: 58) . Another interesting finding was that if you analyse which Internet offerings are most popular with audiences, the top online providers of news are, in fact, very frequently conventional media players. In the United Kingdom, "10 of the top 15 online providers of news" are dominant conventional media players and the remainder are news aggregators rather than "alternative" providers of news (ibid.: 13).
So, even though it is possible to foresee that changes in media supply and in consumption habits will gradually alter the picture over time, at present it is very much the case that mainstream media brands and services still predominate within patterns of media consumption. And this suggests that, whatever new challenges arise for policymakers in seeking to update protections for media pluralism in future (on account of new sources of control over access points to content, e.g. search engines), at present there is still a need to try and ensure diverse ownership of traditional media, that is press and television broadcasting.
In relation to the proposed takeover of BSkyB by News Corporation, Ofcom examined patterns of news consumption across television, radio, newspapers and the Internet with a view towards assessing share of "voice" by media organisations. Quantifying the relationship between ownership of media by organisations and influence is not an easy task because there is no universally agreed method to fall back on. But the measure adopted by Ofcom which was based on "minutes of media use" is similar to that used MAC/PTWE Page-79 9781137017543_07_cha06
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Gillian Doyle 79 by other independent media consultancies such as Enders Analysis (Enders and Goodall, 2010: 18) . One weakness with this approach is the assumption that a minute of news consumption is equal across all platforms whereas some would argue that, for example, television deserves a heavier weighting because it has more immediacy and impact (Ofcom, 2010: 57) . Nevertheless, on the basis of an equally weighted analysis of usage, the UK regulator concluded that because News Corporation already had a share of voice of around 14% and BSkyB a further 10%, combined ownership of the two enterprises would pose a threat to plurality. Bearing in mind that, aside from its television interests, News Corporation already had "the highest readership of all newspaper groups" in the United Kingdom (ibid.: 32) and was "the third largest internet news provider" (ibid.: 34) and had "a strong presence in the provision of news content to radio broadcasters" (ibid.: 38), Ofcom raised concern that if the proposed takeover were to go ahead then "there may not be a sufficient plurality of persons with control of media enterprises providing news and current affairs to UK-wide cross-media audiences" (ibid.: 90) (Figure 6 .2). News Corporation was already by far the largest media owner in the United Kingdom (aside from the BBC) and allowing it to increase its share of voice would, in Ofcom's view, operate against the public interest. Ofcom therefore recommended that the deal should not be approved but, instead, it should be sent directly to the Competition Commission for a second round of investigation (Ofcom, 2010: 12) . find ways to address the concerns set out in the Ofcom report so that the deal could be approved. News Corporation proposed a spin-off of the Sky news operation as a separate entity which would ensure its ongoing independence. Even so, many commentators were sceptical about whether this would really work or whether a merged News-BSkyB entity would, through developing cross-media digital products and services ahead of rivals, be empowered to strengthen over time its existing dominance and share of UK media voice (Ofcom, 2010: 82, 84) . Hunt, apparently convinced by the assurances of editorial independence for BSkyB offered by News Corporation, signalled that, despite opposition in various quarters, he was minded to give approval to the deal and, in early July 2011, he offered just one final week for concerned parties to voice any objections (Fenton, 2011b: 4) . During this one final consultation period, a scandal erupted when clear evidence emerged of unethical journalistic practices including phonehacking at UK newspaper titles owned by News Corporation. The revelation of illegal practices caused a huge public outcry that, in turn, led to a decision by News Corporation to withdraw its proposal to take over BSkyB (Ross, 2011: 8) . It also precipitated the setting up by the UK government of an independent public inquiry -the Leveson Inquiry -led by Lord Justice Leveson and with a remit to investigate not only press standards but also relations between politicians and media owners and the general efficacy of media ownership policies in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's so-called Berlusconi moment passed safely amid an unprecedented outpouring of public anger and anxiety about the perils of media empire-building.
Effectiveness of the current UK regulatory framework
In common with many other countries in Western Europe and beyond, the United Kingdom has a long-established regulatory framework at national level, which, in theory, is supposed to prevent the development of undesirable concentrations of media ownership. Historically, the United Kingdom used to rely heavily on the approach of imposing upper limits on how much of the media (what share of ownership of radio, television or press) any private individual or organisation may own and control. But, over the last couple of decades, politicians and regulators in the United Kingdom, as in many other countries (including France, Germany and Italy) have been under great pressure to de-regulate media ownership restrictions. Large media firms have had success in persuading national governments to reduce safeguards for pluralism, on the grounds that these safeguards put domestic firms at a potential disadvantage to rivals from other countries.
A progressive relaxation of media ownership regulation in the United Kingdom has resulted in a "hybrid" approach whereby, at present, just a few restrictions over cross-media ownership still remain in place (in the 2003 Communications Act) but the main safeguard for pluralism is a public The problem with a public interest test is that it relies on the exercise of ministerial discretion. As is clear from evidence taken by the Leveson Inquiry, few UK politicians would wish to get onto a collision course with a powerful media owner such as News Corporation's Rupert Murdoch (Fenton, 2012: 3) . Therefore, it follows that a statutory regime to protect pluralism that relies on the exercise of discretionary powers by a minister is very unlikely to work.
As is reflected in current data on levels of concentrated ownership of UK media and in the progressive de-regulation of media ownership rules in the United Kingdom over recent years, levels of political influence already wielded by existing media owners seem to make it virtually impossible for domestic politicians to take a balanced or dispassionate or truly independent approach to the problem of media empire-building. In the case of the proposed takeover of BSkyB by News Corporation, whereas the communications regulator Ofcom had cautioned against this and called for a referral to the competition authorities on public interest grounds (Ofcom, 2010) , Culture Minister Jeremy Hunt nonetheless entered negotiations with News Corporation and moved inexorably toward approving the deal. This demonstrates an inherent systemic weakness. The nature of our contemporary systems of political communication is such that politicians are dependent on fostering good relations with the media and so, notwithstanding a few honourable exceptions, a general and widespread reluctance has been evident (among Labour as well as Conservative politicians in the United Kingdom) to instigate policies that might cut across the commercial interests of powerful corporate media players.
Conclusion
This chapter argues that the development of the private television industry in the United Kingdom has been shaped by a regulatory and policy environment that, in turn, has frequently been characterised by a wish to promote high levels of competition and diversity. The development of the ITV broadcasting network was predicated on promoting regional diversity. Expansion of the television industry through cable and satellite was embraced as adding to a rich landscape of commercial broadcast offerings. Similarly, the guiding philosophy that underpinned the fostering of an independent production sector was that of "letting a thousand flowers bloom". However, despite a MAC/PTWE Page-82 9781137017543_07_cha06
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82 European and National Experiences recurrent emphasis on promoting competition, regulation appears to have been somewhat uncertain on the question of how best to facilitate technological change and industrial development while at the same time sustaining protections for pluralism and diversity. It is widely recognised that, for democracy to flourish and in the interests of social cohesion, systems of media provision need to facilitate diversity and a plurality of media content and sources. But if, in the interest of promoting pluralism, curbs are placed on the extent to which television companies and newspapers are allowed to grow or diversify into other sectors of the media, then such restrictions will impact not only on pluralism but also on a set of economic concerns in and around permitted levels of growth for media organisations. Although firms involved in takeovers sometimes exaggerate or simply miscalculate the likely benefits the deal will give rise to, there is nonetheless plenty of evidence to suggest that strategies of expansion in the media can yield a range of very specific commercial and economic advantages, for example, lower input costs, greater critical mass, economies of scale and scope, opportunities for cross promotion, and reduced transaction costs (Doyle, 2002) . Policymaking is supposed to strike a balance between economic concerns about facilitating growth and adaptation to market and technological opportunities versus pluralism. In Ofcom's last official review of the United Kingdom's media ownership rules, the need to achieve a balance between "ensuring a range of viewpoints are available in national and local media; and allowing companies to innovate and have sustainable businesses" was explicitly acknowledged (Ofcom, 2009a: 3) . However, in the United Kingdom, it has been the case for many years that industrial voices have carried far greater political influence than those supporting the need for pluralism.
In the free-to-air commercial television sector, pressure from the regional ITV companies towards consolidation resulted in de-regulatory concessions that enabled a series of mergers and acquisitions, which led to the formation of ITV plc in 2004. In the independent television sector, recognition on the part of the government that excessive fragmentation could be damaging to the business development of the sector resulted in a re-direction of policy which, through focusing on better terms of trade, has indirectly supported industry consolidation and the emergence of more concentrated and profitable "super-indies", albeit that most independents still have a long way to go before being able to challenge power of vertically integrated broadcasters.
The development of new delivery platforms for commercial television and of pay-television has added significantly to diversity and choice while also posing new questions and challenges for UK policymakers in relation to how to deal with monopolised control over specific access points and bottlenecks along the vertical supply chain for media (Vick, 2006: 37) . Indeed, the United Kingdom was said to have encountered a "Berlusconi moment" in 2011 when News Corporation sought to increase its ownership stake
